Editing Carvaka School of Thought in Indian Philosophy (section)

=== '''Etymology of Carvaka''' ===
The Brihaspati Sutra and other pieces of Carvaka's main literature are lost or missing. Its theories and growth have been drawn from ancient secondary literature, including the shastras (such as the Arthashastra), sutras, and Hindu epics (the Mahabharata and Ramayana), as well as conversations by Gautama Buddha and Jain literature. The traditional founder of this school is thought to have been the heretical teacherBrhaspati. Sadly, his Sutra has been lost, despite the fact that we have no reason to dispute it. This Brhaspati is sometimes compared to the gods' teacher who taught the Asuras materialism in order to ruin them. Carvaka, after whose name this school is so called, is said to be the chief disciple of Brhaspati. According to another view, Carvaka is the name of the founder of this school(Shastri, 1930, p. 28)<sup>12</sup>. ‘Carvaka’ is the word that generally stands for ‘materialist’. But the original meaning of this word is shrouded in mystery. According to one view, ‘Carvaka’ was originally the name of a sage who propounded materialism. The common name ‘Carvaka’ is derived from this proper name and means the follower of that sage, i.e., a materialist. According to another view, ‘Carvaka’ was even originally a common descriptive name given to a materialist, either because he preaches the doctrine of ‘eat, drink and be merry’ (carv- eat, chew), or because his words are pleasant and nice (caru-nice, vak-word) (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 64)<sup>2</sup>. Another synonym of Carvaka is Lokayata which means a commoner and therefore, by implication, a man of low and unrefined taste. Nastika-Shiromani or an ‘arch-heretic’ is another name for a materialist. In Ramayana, they are called ‘fools who think themselves to be wise and who are experts in leading people to doom and ruin’ (Sharma, 1962, 29)<sup>11</sup>. References to them are also found in Mahabharata and Manusamhita. Ajitakeshakambalin is mentioned in the MajjhimaNikaya as a materialist who only trusted in perception and the four elements. He was likely given this name since he must have carried a blanket of hair with him. He is also referred to as Kambalashvatara by Shantaraksita (the man with a blanket and a mule). But whoever the founder of Indian materialism, ‘Carvaka’ has become synonymous with ‘materialist’. A much later work by Jayarashi Bhatta called Tattvopaplavasimha, which was published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda in 1940, is the only original work from this school that has survived. Consequently, it is exceedingly challenging to have a true understanding of it. The writings of other schools serve as our main information sources. However, this is just done to challenge materialism. So we discover that the principles of materialism are frequently misinterpreted. The negative aspects of this school are highlighted, while its positive aspects are left out. So, instead of a whole picture, we just receive a thin caricature. A synopsis of this school is provided by the Sarva-Darshana-Sangraha, however, it also appears to be based on similar narratives.

==== '''Epistemology''' ====
It is legitimate to say that the entire philosophy of Carvakas is based on their notion of knowledge or epistemology. Knowledge of reality or valid cognition is called ‘prama’ and the source of such knowledge is called ‘pramana’. The Carvakas maintain that perception is the only pramana or reliable source of knowledge. What is arrived at by direct perception is the truth. That alone exists. What is not perceivable is non-existent, for the simple reason that it is not perceived (Radhakrishnan, 1927, 279)<sup>9</sup>. They assert that the only correct knowledge is that we can perceive through our senses. To authenticate their stance, they criticise the potentiality of other sources of knowledge like inference and testimony which are accounted as valid pramanas by many other philosophical schools of thought. The Carvaka is the only school of traditional thought that solely recognised and acknowledged ''pratyaksha'' (perception) as a legitimate form of knowledge. The idea is derived mainly from Madhava's treatment of the Lokayata-epistemology in the ''Sarvadarshansangraha.'' That which is not perceived is non-existent according to this school of thought. 

==== '''Denial of Inference''' ====
This leads the Carvakas to deny and refute the validity of other sources of knowledge like inference. The Carvakas proceed to deny the legitimacy of inference in a systematic and destructive manner. Inference is the process by which we claim one proposition to be true or false on the basis of other propositions. The Carvakas argue that if inference is to be considered a pramana, it must produce knowledge that is accurate to reality and about the veracity of which we have no doubt. However, inference is unable to satisfy these requirements because for instance, when we infer the existence of fire in a mountain from the perception of smoke in it, we take a leap in the dark, from the perceived smoke to the unperceived fire (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 65-66)<sup>2</sup>. A universal relationship (vyapti) between the major terms and the middle term (Linga) is required for inference (sadhya). But this is an excessive assumption or vyapti. No source of valid knowledge can guarantee it. Thus, for example, the inference of fire (sadhya) from smoke (linga) can be valid only when it is established that all cases of smoke are cases of fire (vyapti). But there is no source of valid knowledge that can justify this universal relation. Perception cannot do it because it is limited to particulars<sup>.</sup> (Chattopadhyaya, 1959, 22-23)<sup>3</sup>. 

An invariable concomitance between smoke and fire can only be established if we have the knowledge of all the cases of smoke and fire, which is impossible as we cannot perceive all the cases of smoke and fire existing presently in different parts of the world, to speak nothing of those which existed in the past or will exist in the future. Therefore, perception cannot establish an immutable connection. A general proposition may be true in perceiving cases, but there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases.

There are two patterns of inference which in modern terminology may be referred to as “deductive” and “inductive” inference. From an epistemological point of view, The Carvakas  reject not only the distinction between deductive and inductive inference but also inference itself as an invalid and unreliable source of knowledge (Pulingandla, 1975, 28-29)<sup>8</sup>. The Carvakas say that deductive patterns like-

‘All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal’, cannot be accepted because we cannot say that Socrates is mortal unless we are certain that the statements "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man" are true.

The principle of petitio principii vitiates deductive inference.Being that the conclusion is already implied by the major premise, the veracity of which is not already established, it is merely a circular argument. 

Let's now look at the inductive pattern of reasoning to determine the validity of the generalisation that "All men are mortal."

A universal proposition is supported by specific propositions in induction. That is, we get to the conclusion that all men are mortal by observing that certain men, like x, y, and z, are mortal. Carvakas, though, believes that this is a plunge into the unknown. All that we are permitted to know is that, up to this point, all men have been mortal, hence this universal premise is unwarranted.

Deductive inference’s main premises are upheld by inductive inference, which sets out to demonstrate their truth. But because it moves unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown, induction too becomes uncertain and unsure. 

This reasoning of Carvakas is faced with an inevitable question - What explains the uniformities that experienced objects possess if Carvakas deny the existence of a fixed universal law underlying the phenomenon of the world? ‘Why is fire always experienced to be hot and water to be cool?’ 

The Carvakas reply is that it is due to the inherent nature (svabhava) of things that they possess particular characteristics. There is no guarantee that the uniformity perceived in the past would continue in the future (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 67-68)<sup>2</sup>. 

Every system of Indian philosophy that has maintained the validity of at least perception and inference has harshly attacked the crude Carvaka stance. Rejecting the validity of inference from an empirical perspective is equivalent to rejecting thought and discussion. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. The Carvaka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. The Carvaka can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas, not being material objects, cannot be perceived; they can only be inferred. It is frequently discovered that perception itself, which the Carvaka holds to be genuine, is false. Although it is almost round, the world appears to be flat to us. The earth is moving around the sun even though we think of it as being static. The sun's disc may appear little to us, yet it is much larger than the size of the earth. Such perceptions are in conflict with inference (Sharma, 1962, 31-32)<sup>11</sup>. 

Due to the dearth of original literature on Carvaka's philosophy, a question which is justifiably encountered is whether the commentators of the base texts, which were mostly his opponents, were able to sufficiently reflect the intention of the author. Therefore it is imperative to reconstruct and reiterate the Carvaka philosophy at the very fundamental level of its assumptions of epistemology and construction of knowledge. Did Carvakas really hold the view that perception is the only source of valid knowledge and nothing else? 

In the ''Tattvasangrahapanjika, Kamalsila'' quotes Purandara’s statement- “The Carvakas too admit of such an inference as is well known in the world, but that which is called inference ( by some ), transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited by them.” This is called the ''lokaprasiddhaanumana,'' an inference which is acceptable within the framework of our mundane life, however, one proposed to extend its application beyond the range of this-worldly objects shall be discarded outrightly. 

Jayantabhatta, in his ''Nyayamanjari'' distinguished between two types of inferential cognition: (1) “some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself” (''utpanna-pratiti)'' and (2) “some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on somebody else’s advice” (''utpadya-pratiti). Utpanna-pratiti'' refers to something experienced in the past, and ''utpadya-pratiti'' means that which is yet to be experienced. He, therefore, suggested that the first kind is valid, but the second is not. The inference of the fire from the smoke belongs to the first category. The inference of transcendent entities like God belongs to the latter. As a result, the first type of anumana is recognised as pramana, whereas the second is not. This viewpoint, according to Jayantabhatta, is held by the Carvakas who are "better educated" (susikshitara). Summarily, it can be concluded that the Carvaka position on ''anumana'' can be presented - empirically testable ''anumana''is ''pramana''in the instrumental sense of the term, but ''anumana''which is not so testable is not ''pramana''even in the instrumental sense ( as seen in the case of ''utpadya-pratiti)'' (Gokhale, 1993, 676-678)<sup>5</sup>''.''

Hence it cannot be conclusively established that the Carvakas rejected ''anumana'' (inference) in all entirety as seen in the above examples. Manibhadra, in his commentary on ''Sat Darshan Samuccaya,'' gave some extremely striking reasons for the Carvaka or Lokayata emphasis on the primacy of sense-perception. The causes are socio-political and seem eerily contemporary. There are crafty con artists who dress in religious attire. They're trying to instil false beliefs in people's heads about achieving paradise and being able to distinguish between the good and the wicked etc. and are trying to establish their claims on the basis of futile references to such sources of valid knowledge as inferences, scriptures, etc. The Lokayata insistence on the primacy of sense-perception was meant to be a defence against such deception and exploitation. If the unperceived too, as Manibhadra explains, were given the status of existence then the poor could as well delude themselves with the idea of possessing a heap of gold and such they would trample over their sense of poverty with a kind of indifference; the slave, too, would delude himself with the idea that he had become the master (Chattopadhyaya, 1959, p. 29-30)<sup>3</sup>. As a result, just as orthodox religious defenders felt it necessary to reject reason in favour of faith, the Lokayatikas and Carvakas felt it necessary to refute the false assertions of the deceivers in order to defend the general populace.